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Cover von: All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with a Social Norm against Lying
Ville Korpela

All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with a Social Norm against Lying

Rubrik: Articles
Jahrgang 173 (2017) / Heft 2, S. 376-393 (18)
Publiziert 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245616X14689075188007
Veröffentlicht auf Englisch.
inkl. gesetzl. MwSt.
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Beschreibung
We say that a society has a weak norm against lying if, all other things being equal, agents try to avoid getting caught lying. We show that if this is the case, and it usually is, then Bayesian monotonicity is no longer a constraint in implementation and all incentive-compatible social-choice functions are Bayesian implementable. In contrast to the previous literature, our result does not rely on any kind of intrinsic lying aversion, on which the experimental evidence is mixed.