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Cover von: Cartel Conduct and Antitrust Compliance with Imperfect Information about Enforcement Risk
Johannes Paha

Cartel Conduct and Antitrust Compliance with Imperfect Information about Enforcement Risk

Rubrik: Articles
Jahrgang 174 (2018) / Heft 3, S. 448-475 (28)
Publiziert 05.09.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245617X14996661407776
Veröffentlicht auf Englisch.
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Beschreibung
This article models antitrust compliance training as a form of information acquisition. It finds that lower fines may benefit consumers by improving the deterrence of cartels: Sales managers who underestimate the severity of antitrust enforcement sometimes establish cartels that are actually unprofitable for their firms. This risk rises if an antitrust authority lowers the sanctions imposed on anticompetitive conduct. Therefore, it is a best response for firms' compliance officers to establish antitrust training programs to mitigate this risk and prevent cartels. Fines must however not be reduced so strongly as to make anticompetitive collusion profitable.