Compulsory Disclosure of Private Information: Theoretical and Experimental Results for the Acquiring-a-Company Game - 10.1628/jite-2018-0013 - Mohr Siebeck
Wirtschaftswissenschaft

Werner Güth, Kerstin Pull, Manfred Stadler, Alexandra K. Zaby

Compulsory Disclosure of Private Information: Theoretical and Experimental Results for the Acquiring-a-Company Game

Jahrgang 175 () / Heft 3, S. 502-523 (22)

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Compulsory disclosure of private information to an uninformed seller or buyer ofa company is intended to induce welfare-enhancing transactions. Our theoretical and experimental investigation suggests different effects of information disclosure on seller and buyer decisions. When sellers are uninformed, information disclosure increases the probability of transactions, whereas when buyers are uninformed, disclosure increases the probability of transactions only if sellers' valuation of the company is sufficiently high. We extend the acquiring-a-company game to derive predictions regarding the effects of disclosure and experimentally investigate the transition from asymmetric to symmetric information.
Personen

Werner Güth ist emeritierter Direktor am Max-Planck-Institut für Erforschung von Kollektivgütern in Bonn.

Kerstin Pull ist Professorin für BWL an der Universität Tübingen (Lehrstuhl für Personal & Organisation).

Manfred Stadler ist o. Professor für VWL an der Universität Tübingen.

Alexandra K. Zaby ist ab September 2019 Professorin an der Privaten Universität Schloss Seeburg, Seekirchen am Wallersee in Österreich.