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Cover von: Endowment Effects in Proposal Rights Contests
Sang-Hyun Kim, Chulyoung Kim, Youjin Hahn

Endowment Effects in Proposal Rights Contests

Rubrik: Articles
Jahrgang 177 (2021) / Heft 4, S. 449-476 (28)
Publiziert 09.11.2021
DOI 10.1628/jite-2021-0018
Veröffentlicht auf Englisch.
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  • 10.1628/jite-2021-0018
We experimentally investigate a two-stage game where players compete to be recognized as a proposer in the first stage and play an ultimatum bargaining game in the second stage. We introduce a treatment regarding whether one of the subjects is framed to have proposal rights (without any material advantage) in the beginning of the game. We found that subjects who were framed to be »incumbents« spent significantly more resources to keep their proposal rights than others. We also present and analyze additional behavioral patterns observed in our proposal rights contest experiment.