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Cover von: More Rights, Less Income?: An Economic Analysis of the New Copyright Law in Germany
Roland Kirstein, Michael Karas

More Rights, Less Income?: An Economic Analysis of the New Copyright Law in Germany

Rubrik: Articles
Jahrgang 175 (2019) / Heft 3, S. 420-458 (39)
Publiziert 02.04.2019
DOI 10.1628/jite-2019-0029
Veröffentlicht auf Englisch.
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Beschreibung
We investigate the conflict between authors and their publishers that may result from a copyright system that allows authors to transfer copyrights to an additional publisher. A two-period bargaining model analyzes effects of competition, time preferences, and bargaining power on license prices, publisher investments, and authors' lifetime incomes. We demonstrate that authors benefit from the new copyright system if new publishers continue the distribution of their orphaned works. Authors do not necessarily benefit if exclusive publishers are still exploiting licenses, because high levels of competition result in underinvestment by publishers and in internalization effects during contract negotiations.