Keren Weinshall, Ifat Taraboulos

Plaintiff Favoritism in Judicial Cost-Shifting Decisions

Jahrgang 179 () / Heft 1, S. 156-189 (34)
Publiziert 31.01.2023

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Are judges inclined to favor plaintiffs over defendants? We analyze the relationships between win rates and cost-shifting outcomes in the Israeli loser-pays regime. Though qualitative analysis of semistructured interviews with judges assures us that litigants are equal in the cost-shifting arena, quantitative analysis portrays evidence to the contrary: judges allocate more and higher costs in favor of prevailing plaintiffs than defendants. Results are replicated in three datasets: a sample of all civil cases, small claims between individuals, and claims with matching counterclaims. We discuss explanations for this implicit pro-plaintiff effect in cost-shifting and implications for a possible broader pro-plaintiff bias.

Keren Weinshall Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.

Ifat Taraboulos Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.